Tom Hansen, Douglas A. Hilton, Mike Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox, and Russell Vickers v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Roger Barrus, Roger Morse, and John Does 1-25 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Tom Hansen, Douglas A. Hilton, Mike
Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox, and Russell Vickers v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Roger Barrus,
Roger Morse, and John Does 1-25 : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gordon L. Roberts; Spencer E. Austin; William J. Evans; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Ray G.
Groussman; Charles E. Greenhawt; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees.
James E. Morton; Ronald C. Wolthuis; Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen; Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, No. 900420.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3182
KF 
B5.9 
IS9 
POCKET NO. 
BRIEF, 
QC^ZO 
CHE UTAH SUPREME C0URT 
* * * * * * * * 
TOM HANSEN, DOUGLAS A. HILTON, 
MIKE MACKINTOSH, BRUCE SILCOX, 
and RUSSELL VICKERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
ROGER BARRUS, ROGER MORSE, and 
JOHN DOES 1-25, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
ROGER BARRUS and ROGER MORSE, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CCI MECHANICAL, INC., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 900420 
Priority #16 
* * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDE 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
JAMES E. MORTON (A3739) 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS (4699) 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON 
& SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
GORDON L,. ROBERTS (2770) 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and[for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, #700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lakts City , UT 84147-0898 
Telephone (801) 5 3 ^ 1 1 3 4 ^ EZ T 
RAY G. GROUSSMAN (1263) 
CHARLES E. GREENHAWT (43^g)| 2 1991 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lak^ City , UT g^&jPRtMECOU 
Attorneys for Defendants/
 l ( T A U 
Appellees U I A M 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
* * * * * * * * 
TOM HANSEN, DOUGLAS A. HILTON, 
MIKE MACKINTOSH, BRUCE SILCOX, 
and RUSSELL VICKERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
ROGER BARRUS, ROGER MORSE, and 
JOHN DOES 1-25, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
ROGER BARRUS and ROGER MORSE, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CCI MECHANICAL, INC., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 900420 
Priority #16 
* * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
JAMES E. MORTON (A3739) 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS (4699) 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON 
& SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
GORDON L. ROBERTS (2770) 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, #700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
RAY G. GROUSSMAN (1263) 
CHARLES E. GREENHAWT (4712) 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84139 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
I. PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
All parties involved in the proceeding below are listed 
on the caption page of this Brief, Third-party defendant, CCI 
Mechanical, Inc., did not take part in the proceedings in the 
District Court and it does not take part in this appeal. 
(i) 
II. TABLE OP CONTENTS 
Page 
I. PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW. . i 
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
IV. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING 1 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
VI. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS | 1 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
VIII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
IX. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT | 10 
X. ARGUMENT 12 
A. None of the Plaintiffs Have a Presently 
Existing Compensable Personal Injury 13 
B. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 21 
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For 
Medical Surveillance » 28 
CONCLUSION [ 34 
ADDENDUM . . 36 
(ii) 
III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) 17 
Adams v. Johns-Manville, 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986) 27n 
Anderson v. W. R. Grace & Co,, 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. 
Mass. 1986) 15 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) 16 
Ayers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 
A.2d 184 (1983) 31 
Avers v. Jackson Township, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 
A.2d 1314 (1985) 31 
Avers v. Jackson Township. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 
(N.J. 1987) 14, 29n, 30 
Brafford v. Susguehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. 
Colo. 1984) 15 
Burns v. Jaguays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 
1987) 17 
Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Installation, 324 Pa. 
Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super 1984) 27n 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) 12-13 
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 
193 (Utah 1990) 25 
DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App. 
1987) 19n, 32 
Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. 
Super. 1985) 19n 
Eagle Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 
(Fla. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 
1986) 16 
Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp. , 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 15n 
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 
(5th Cir. 1985) 15n, 27n 
(iii) 
Haqqertv v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 
reh'q denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) 15n 
Hariq v. Jones-Manville Products Corp., 394 A.2d 299 
(Md. 1978)) 16n 
Herber v. Johns-Manville, 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986) 27n 
In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 
(D. Hawaii 1990) 19, 19n 
In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. 
Matsushita Electric Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) 12 
Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) 22 
Lavelle v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 507 N.E.2d 
476 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1987) 19n 
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 
(Tenn. 1982) 15n 
Maughan v. SW Servicing Inc.. 758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 
1985) 16n 
Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16 
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Mauro v. 
Ravmark Industries, et al., 561 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1989) 19n 
Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of America, 480 A.2d 647 
(Del. Sup. 1984) 27n 
Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 684 F. Supp. 847 
(M.D. Pa. 1988) 29, 29n 
Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 13 
Nutt v. A.C.& S.. Inc.. 466 A.2d 18 (Del. Sup. 1983), 
aff'd. 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984) 27n 
Pavton v. Abbott Laboratories. 386 Mass. 540, 437 
N.E.2d 171 (1982) 27n 
Pollack v. Johns-Manville Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489 
(D.N.J. 1988) 19n 
Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing Co.. 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986)10, 16, 20 
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail). 758 
F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1985) 18, 19n 
Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979) 13 
(iv) 
Treloqqan v. Treloqqan. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) 13 
Villari v. Terminix International, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
727 (E.D. Pa. 1987) 15, 29n 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 303 comment a 24 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 313 (1965) 10, 22-23 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 436A (1965) 24 
Utah Code Ann. S78-2-2(3) (j ) (1990) 1 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ...1, 12 
(v) 
IV. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal taken from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants issued Iqy Judge James S. Sawaya 
of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S78-2-2(3)(j) (1990). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court correctly find that no com-
pensable bodily injury had been manifested in any plaintiff? 
2. Did the District Court correctly rule that mere 
exposure to asbestos dust, in the absence of any resultant physi-
cal injury, is insufficient ground upon vrthich to base a claim for 
damages due to negligent infliction of emotional distress? 
3. Did the District Court correctly rule that plain-
tiffs are not entitled to damages for medical surveillance when 
there is no evidence that such surveillance is reasonably neces-
sary for detection of the alleged latent disease? 
VI. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provision in! this case is Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(c) which provides in part: "The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." 
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VII. STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
1* On February 10, 1989, appellants Tom Hansen, 
Douglas A. Hilton, Mike Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox and Russell 
Vickers, plaintiffs in the action below, (hereinafter collec-
tively referred to as "plaintiffs") filed suit in Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County (hereinafter "District Court"), seeking 
damages allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos 
particles. Plaintiffs alleged six causes of action: common law 
fraud, negligence, strict liability, negligent misrepresentation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless 
disregard/punitive damages. (Complaint at HH 35-61, R. 008-015). 
2. On February 22, 1990, defendants Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel"), Roger Barrus and Roger Morse, 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "defendants"), filed a 
motion for summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiffs' causes 
of action on the grounds that no plaintiff suffered any compensa-
ble physical injury or emotional distress. 
3. After reviewing the record, the memoranda of the 
parties, and the testimony and admissions of the plaintiffs as 
contained in their responses to written interrogatories and in 
their depositions, and after hearing oral argument, the District 
Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge pre-
siding, granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in a 
Minute Entry dated May 21, 1990. (R. 540). 
4. On July 23, 1990, Judge Sawaya entered an Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing with 
prejudice all plaintiffs' causes of action on the ground that no 
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bodily injury had been manifested in atiy plaintiff. The court 
granted plaintiffs leave to re-file their complaint in the event 
that a bodily injury manifested itself in the future. (R. 
542-43). (The Order Granting Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment is reproduced in the Addendum of this Brief.) 
5. On August 20, 1990, plaintiffs filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court an appeal from the District Court's dismissal of 
their claims. (R. 544-45). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1986, plaintiffs began working on a con-
struction project to renovate the basement of Mountain Fuel's 
downtown office building. (R.004.) At the time, each plaintiff 
was an employee of CCI Mechanical, Inc., which provided construc-
tion services under a subcontract with Mpuntain Fuel. (R.240-41, 
261-62, 281, 298, 319.) While engaged in the renovation project, 
plaintiffs removed some insulating material that later proved to 
contain asbestos. (R.007.) For the purposes of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and for purposes of this appeal, Mountain Fuel 
concedes that, for a period of time, plaintiffs were exposed to 
airborne asbestos particles. 
The District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims is 
supported by the uncontroverted medical evidence in the record. 
In their responses to defendants' interrogatories, plaintiffs 
described the immediate effects of the alleged exposure to 
include transitory coughing, wheezing, tightness in the chest, 
headache and eye irritation (R.251, 271, 289, 309, 328.) None of 
the plaintiffs, however, sought medical treatment for the claimed 
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immediate effects of the exposure. In May of 1987, Dr. 
Battigelli of the Occupational Clinic for the Department of Fam-
ily and Preventive Medicine at the University of Utah, examined 
Hansen, Hilton, Silcox and Vickers in connection with attorney 
Robert L. Stolebarger*s representation of plaintiffs. In a let-
ter to Mr. Stolebarger, Dr. Battigelli stated that plaintiffs' 
exposure to asbestos while working at Mountain Fuel was "limited 
and perhaps inconsequential." (R.372-74.) Dr. Battigelli stated 
that "[t]he workers by and large denied acute bouts of coughing, 
choking and related symptoms which would suggest overwhelming 
exposure." (R.373.) Dr. Battigelli concluded that "none of 
these individuals presented. . . evidence of respiratory disor-
ders which could be meaningfully related to [the Mountain Fuel] 
exposure." (id.) Dr. Battigelli was the only physician to exam-
ine plaintiffs and his opinion was uncontroverted before the Dis-
trict Court. 
The District Court's ruling is also supported by a 
review of the evidence presented with respect to each individual 
plaintiff. Although plaintiff Tom Hansen stated in his responses 
to interrogatories and in his deposition that he experienced 
coughing, respiratory distress, chest tightness, headache and eye 
irritation as a result of the immediate exposure to asbestos par-
ticles, (R.251.) he was not treated for these initial symptoms. 
(R.252.) Indeed, Hansen has never sought nor received treatment 
for any alleged injury relating to the occurrences complained of 
in this lawsuit. (R.252-53.) Although Hansen claimed in his 
deposition that he still had "recurring chest colds" and 
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"shortness of breath/' no health care provider has ever attrib-
uted these symptoms to asbestos exposure. (R.242-43.) Moreover, 
although he alleged that he experienced anxiety and sleeplessness 
worrying about potential injury, he never sought nor received 
psychological therapy or treatment for any symptom relating to 
his alleged exposure to asbestos. (R.243.) In fact, it is 
undisputed that Hansen has never been treated for any injury 
allegedly received as a result of the occurrences complained of 
in this lawsuit. (R.253.) He has not incurred any medical 
expenses or claimed any loss of wages, earnings or income as a 
result of any alleged physical or psychological injury. (R.258.) 
He can only guess as to whether he has sustained or will sustain 
any permanent injury as a result of exposure to asbestos. 
(R.242-43, 245.) 
The evidence before the District Court with respect to 
plaintiff Douglas Hilton showed that he experienced only cough-
ing, wheezing, tightness in the chest and eye irritation during 
the period he was allegedly exposed to asbestos. (R.271-72.) He 
did not contend that he has any permanent physical injury as a 
result of the alleged exposure and he admitted before the Dis-
trict Court that no health care practitioner has ever told him he 
would develop asbestosis or any asbestos-related disease. 
(R.266-67.) Hilton stated that he suffered "loss of sleep, wor-
rying about what might happen in the future due to exposure to 
asbestos." (R.272.) His anxiety lasted for about one month, 
during which time he was also worried about the results of expo-
sure to other toxic chemicals in an unrelated incident. 
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(R.265-66.) It is disputed that Hilton never sought treatment 
for anxiety in connection with the alleged asbestos exposure. 
(R.265-66.) Although he declared his intention to see a health 
care practitioner to monitor the effects of exposure, Hilton did 
not have a check-up exam in 1988 or 1989. (R.263.) No health 
care practitioner has ever told Hilton that he will develop 
asbestos-related disease, (R.267), and all diagnostic tests per-
formed on Hilton were negative for damage due to asbestos. Id. 
Hilton has incurred no medical expenses, or loss of wages, earn-
ings or income due to any alleged injury. (R.268, 275-77.) 
The District Court's ruling is also supported by a 
review of the evidence with regard to plaintiff, Mike Mackintosh. 
Mackintosh admitted that he did not suffer any ill effects at all 
from the alleged exposure to asbestos. (R.282, 289.) He admit-
ted that he neither sought nor received a medical examination 
after the alleged exposure in 1986, nor did he submit to an exam-
ination in 1987, 1988, or 1989. (R.286.) He admitted that he 
has never sought or received treatment for any alleged physical 
or psychological injury received as a result of any occurrence 
complained in this lawsuit. (R.283, 290-91.) Mackintosh further 
admitted that he does not know of any permanent injury he has 
sustained as a result of asbestos exposure, and he admitted that 
it was "pure guess work" as to whether he would develop any 
asbestos-related disease in the future (R.284-85, 289-90.) More-
over, although he alleged that he suffered from severe anxiety 
concerning his future medical condition, (R.292), he has never 
sought nor received medical treatment for psychological injury 
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due to the alleged exposure. (R.283, 290-91.) The 
uncontroverted evidence before the District Court was that Mack-
intosh has not received any bodily injury, incurred any medical 
expenses, or claimed any lost wages, earnings or income as a 
result of any alleged injury relating to asbestos exposure. 
(R.286, 292-95.) 
There was also ample evidence to support the District 
Court's ruling with regard to plaintiff, Bruce Silcox. Silcox 
admitted that he experienced "severe coughing and respiratory 
distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye irritation" 
immediately following the alleged exposure. (R.309-310.) He 
admitted that he has never sought nor received medical treatment 
for any physical or psychological injury alleged in this lawsuit. 
(R.310-12.) Although Silcox claimed that he experienced conges-
tion, coughing and shortness of breath for some time after the 
initial exposure, the uncontroverted evidence showed that no 
health care practitioner ever told him those symptoms were 
related to asbestos exposure. (R.321.) Dr. Battigelli's exami-
nation of Silcox revealed no physical condition attributable to 
asbestos exposure. (R.347.) In fact, Dr. Battigelli told Silcox 
that his examination was negative for any effect of asbestos 
exposure and that "there wasn't anything to worry about." 
(R.3Q6, 339.) Furthermore, Silcox admitted that any connection 
between his physical symptoms and asbestos exposure was "pure 
guesswork" on his part. (R.303.) Finally, Silcox admitted that 
he has not incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss of 
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wages, earnings or income as a result of any alleged injury 
relating to asbestos exposure. (R.313-16.) 
The District Court also considered the undisputed evi-
dence with regard to plaintiff, Russell Vickers. Vickers admit-
ted that he experienced coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, 
chest tightness, headaches and severe eye irritation immediately 
following the alleged exposure to asbestos. (R.328.) There was 
evidence before the District Court that Silcox was examined by 
Dr. Battigelli at the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and 
Environmental Health on November 20, 1986 for the purpose of 
determining the extent of his injury, if any, due to asbestos 
exposure. (R.369.) But Dr. Battigelli's report states that he 
did not find "any evidence of adverse effects" from the asbestos 
exposure. (id.) The District Court considered Vickers1 claim 
that his wheezing was a symptom of significant duration. 
(R.320.) But it is an undisputed fact that no health care prac-
titioner has ever told Vickers that his wheezing may be attrib-
uted to his inhaling asbestos fibers. (id.) Vickers could 
attribute no other present symptom to asbestos exposure and no 
health care practitioner has ever told him that he has any physi-
cal symptom or condition that may be attributed to asbestos expo-
sure. (R.320-21.) Although he claimed that he suffered severe 
anxiety associated with the uncertainty of his future medical 
condition, Vickers admitted that he has never sought nor received 
any treatment for depression, anxiety, or any form of emotional 
distress. (R.321-22.) 
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The District Court also considered the evidence of 
Vickers1 second examination by Dr. Battigelli in 1987 who stated 
in a letter to Vickers1 counsel that there was no evidence of any 
respiratory disorder that could be related to the exposure to 
asbestos at Mountain Fuel. (R.372-74.) Although Vickers stated 
that he intended to see a physician iri the future, he admitted 
that he had not had a physical examination since 1987. 
(R.324-25.) Vickers also admitted that he could only guess as to 
whether he had sustained any permanent injury as a result of any 
alleged exposure to asbestos. (R.324.) Finally Vickers admitted 
that he has not incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss 
of wages, earnings or income as a result of any occurrence com-
plained of in this lawsuit. (R.323-24, 332-335.) 
There was abundant uncontroverted evidence before the 
District Court to support its decision granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendants. It is undisputed that none of the plain-
tiffs have ever been diagnosed by a health care practitioner as 
presently suffering from asbestosis or dny other asbestos-related 
disease. (R.242-43, 267, 282-83, 302, 320, 341-43.) No plain-
tiff contends that he presently suffers from any form of cancer 
arising from exposure to asbestos; only that he may develop can-
cer in the future. (R.254-55, 274-75, 292, 312-13, 331.) It is 
undisputed that none of the plaintiffs have ever received medical 
treatment for any physical or psychological injury allegedly 
resulting from any occurrence complained of in this lawsuit. 
(R.252-53, 272-73, 289-91, 310-11, 329-30.) Since their initial 
examinations by Dr. Battigelli conducted in connection with 
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anticipated litigation, none of the plaintiffs have had further 
medical evaluations to detect the presence of, or to evaluate the 
future risk of cancer or asbestos-related disease. (R.243, 263, 
286, 299, 325-26.) Finally, the District Court relied on each 
plaintiffs1 admission to conclude that none of the plaintiffs 
have incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss of wages, 
earnings or income as a result of the alleged asbestos exposure. 
(R.255-58, 275-78, 292-95, 313-16, 332-35.) 
IX. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
None of the plaintiffs have a presently existing per-
sonal injury that would entitle them to damages. Under Utah law, 
a claimant must prove the fact of damages with reasonable cer-
tainty. Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1986). Mere exposure to asbestos, even when accompanied by ini-
tial symptoms of coughing, wheezing and eye irritation, does not 
constitute sufficient injury to maintain a cause of action for 
damages. In the present case, no plaintiff has alleged nor has 
any plaintiff produced even a shred of evidence to show presently 
existing asbestos-related disease or injury. Most courts also 
hold that a claimant cannot recover for the increased risk or 
expectation of a future disease associated with exposure to 
asbestos. A showing of "enhanced risk" does not establish the 
fact of damages with reasonable certainty. The District Court, 
therefore, correctly dismissed plaintiffs' causes of action for 
personal injury. 
The District Court also correctly dismissed plaintiffs' 
claims for damages for negligent infliction of emotional 
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distress. In the present case, there is no genuine issue as to 
whether any plaintiff has sustained bodily harm or resulting ill-
ness. No plaintiff has demonstrated any significant physical 
injury accompanying the initial exposure to asbestos, or any psy-
chological injury caused by the emotional trauma of the event. 
In the absence of some bodily harm or illness, the District Court 
properly dismissed plaintiffs1 claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
The District Court also correctly ruled that plaintiffs 
are not entitled to damages for medical surveillance. In cases 
of exposure to toxic chemicals, damages for medical surveillance 
are only available when it can be shown that periodic medical 
examinations are reasonable and necessary to detect and treat 
latent disease. In the present case, plaintiffs have proffered 
no medical evidence indicating that early detection of 
asbestos-related disease requires anything more than routine 
health maintenance. Because there is no evidence demonstrating 
that medical surveillance is reasonable or necessary, the Dis-
trict Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for medical surveil-
lance damages should be sustained. 
The strongest case any of these plaintiffs can present 
is that they were exposed to asbestos dust and that they were 
subject to anecdotal, transitory, subjective and non-verifiable 
complaints and apprehensions. There is no objective evidence, 
let alone medical evidence, which demonstrates a real injury to 
any of these plaintiffs. 
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Under the better reasoned cases, and as a matter of 
sound tort policy, this Court should sustain the District Court. 
A tort has not been committed, nor do statutes of limitations 
even begin to run, until a demonstrable injury has occurred. In 
this day and age of environmental awareness, asbestos in school 
and office buildings, toxic fumes and dusts, and air and water 
pollution, virtually all citizens could mount a case against 
someone as good as the one plaintiffs postulate here. The law 
should discourage such premature filings and require a verifiable 
and objectively demonstrable injury. This policy will serve both 
defendants and claimants since those claimants who ultimately 
suffer real injuries would not be told the statute began to run 
against them when they first coughed and wheezed. 
X. ARGUMENT 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judg-
ment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. When the record, "taken as whole could not lead a 
rational trier-of-fact to find for the non-moving party, summary 
judgment should be granted because there is no 'genuine issue for 
trial.'" In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita 
Electric Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 
S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986) (citations omit-
ted). When the non-moving party has designated no specific facts 
that show there is a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is 
proper even though the moving party has not produced specific 
affidavits or other material negating the claim. Celotex Corp. 
-12-
v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1986). In the present case, plaintiffs have 
introduced absolutely no evidence that would raise an issue of 
material fact. Their mere allegations, unsupported by the evi-
dence or affidavits, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
fact. Thornock v. Cookf 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Their mere 
conclusory statements are insufficient. Norton v. Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). Their unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs 
are insufficient. Treloqqan v. Trelogqan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 
1985). Because plaintiffs have raised no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact, the District Court correctly dismissed their claims as 
a matter of law. 
A. None of the Plaintiffs Have a Presently 
Existing Compensable Personal Injury. 
All of plaintiffs' causes of action were properly dis-
missed by the District Court on the grounds that no presently 
existing bodily injury has been manifested in any plaintiff. (R. 
542-43.) None of the plaintiffs have demonstrated or even 
alleged that they presently have asbestosis, lung cancer, 
mesothelioma or any other asbestos-related disease. Instead, 
plaintiffs have attempted to base their cause of action on the 
minor symptoms associated with immediate exposure to airborne 
dust. They claim they temporarily experienced severe coughing, 
wheezing, tightness in the chest, headaches and eye irritation. 
No plaintiff ever sought or received treatment for those symptoms 
or even alleged that such symptoms ever required any treatment. 
Indeed, the symptoms plaintiffs described could be associated 
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with exposure to ordinary dust in the air. The District Court 
correctly held that such symptoms are insufficient as a matter of 
law to support a claim for damages. 
In their brief on appeal, plaintiffs have argued, as 
they did in the District Court, that mere exposure to asbestos 
dust creates a cause of action for damages. They contend that 
their inhalation of asbestos fibers was an "unconsented-to inva-
sion" resulting in "a tangible risk of major disease.11 (Brief of 
Appellants at 17 (citation omitted)). Although plaintiffs have 
averred that they are not seeking damages for "enhanced risk of 
disease", (Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 14; R.429-30), their theory of recovery amounts to 
exactly that. 
Plaintiffs have relied the case of Avers v. Jackson 
Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987), for the proposition 
that mere exposure to a toxic substance constitutes a compensable 
harm. (Brief of Appellants at 16-17.) The Ayers court, however, 
did not uphold a decision awarding damages for personal injury or 
for enhanced risk of disease. In fact, the court held that the 
claimants could not recover damages for an unquantifiable 
enhanced risk of disease resulting from exposure to toxic chemi-
cals. 525 A.2d at 304-05. While the court suggested it might 
recognize a cause of action for "quantifiable enhanced risk," it 
did not decide the issue. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs have cited other cases in which it was held 
that a claim for enhanced risk of disease could be maintained 
when there is expert testimony concluding with a reasonable 
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degree of medical probabi l i ty that a la tent d i sease w i l l manifest 
i t s e l f . E . g . , Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 
(D.C. Colo. 1984) (when expert opinion concluded with reasonable 
degree of medical probabi l i ty that there had been chromosomal 
damage caused by exposure to high radiat ion , court recognized an 
"increased r isk of cancer" c la im); Vil lftri v. Terminix Interna-
t i o n a l , I n c . , 663 F. Supp. 727, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ( p l a i n t i f f s 
who suf fered physical symptoms from exposure to p e s t i c i d e s had an 
injury g iv ing r i s e to a claim for enhanced r isk of d i s e a s e ) . 
Most cour t s , however, do not recognize a cause of act ion for 
enhanced r i sk of d i s ease in tox ic exposure cases because proof of 
damages i s too uncertain . Even when a claimant can show by medi-
ca l testimony that i t i s more l i k e l y than not he w i l l contract an 
a s b e s t o s - r e l a t e d d i sease in the future^ which p l a i n t i f f s here 
cannot begin to show, compensation should be denied unless and 
u n t i l the d i s ease i s manifest . See Anderson v. W. R. Grace & 
Co. , 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) ( inequity would r e s u l t if 
recovery were allowed based on mere mathematical probab i l i ty that 
1
 The remaining cases cited by plaintiffs ih support of their claim for 
personal injury damages, are not apposite here either because the claimant was 
able to demonstrate presently existing injury, Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff diagnosed with asbestosis and 
lung cancer must sue for all damages in one action, including damages for 
undiagnosed mesothelioma), or because the claimant was not awarded damages for 
personal injury or enhanced risk. E.g., Ayers, 2^5 A.2d at 308; Haggerty v. L 
& L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 
1986) (seaman exposed to toxic chemicals did not state a claim for enhanced 
risk even though his body absorbed chemicals arid doctor verified exposure); 
Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 824 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (claimants recovered only the cost of diagnostic examina-
tions); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S,W.2d 431 (Term. 1982) (claim-
ants recovered only damages for emotional distress when they and their chil-
dren were exposed to pesticides in their water sufpply). 
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the harm will occur); Eagle richer Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 
So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 
1986) (plaintiff who had introduced testimony of a greater than 
50 percent chance of contracting cancer in the future could not 
recover damages but could bring a second action for damages if 
2 
and when cancer a c t u a l l y developed) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of 
ac t ion based on the p o s s i b i l i t y that an injury may occur in the 
fu ture . Under Utah law, "[t ]he fact of damages must be proven 
with reasonable c e r t a i n t y . " Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing Co. , 722 
P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986); Atkin Wright & Miles v . Mountain 
S t a t e s Telephone & Telegraph Co. , 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985) 
( the standard of proof required for e s t a b l i s h i n g the fact of dam-
ages i s greater than that required for e s t a b l i s h i n g the amount). 
To al low a p l a i n t i f f to recover for mere exposure to a t o x i c sub-
s tance would permit a claim for damages based on pure specu la -
t i o n . As a matter of law, a claim for "enhanced risk" i s not 
2
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in cases involving sus-
pected carcinogens, i t may be appropriate to apply the "discovery rule" and to 
tol l the statute of limitations until actual discovery of the injury. See 
Maughan v. SW Servicing Inc., 758 P.2d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Utah law). In Maughan, Judge Winder noted that "where there are exceptional 
circumstances that would make application of the law unjust, [the Utah Supreme 
Court] has adopted the discovery rule by judicial action." Id. at 1385 (quot-
ing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983)). The court 
further noted that "[t]he discovery rule has been applied to to l l the statute 
of limitations until discovery of the injury and i t s causation in latent dis-
ease and malpractice cases in numerous jurisdictions." Id. (citing, inter 
al ia, Louisville v. Jones-Manvilie Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); 
Hariq v. Jones-Manville Products Corp., 394 A.2d 299 (Md. 1978)). 
- 1 6 -
cognizable in Utah. Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336 (amount of l o s s must 
be shown by evidence that r i s e s above mere s p e c u l a t i o n ) ; see a l s o 
Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728,j732 (Utah 1984) (damages 
must not be so i n d e f i n i t e so as to allow the jury to speculate as 
to the amount). 
Courts that have considered claims brought by v ic t ims 
of asbestos exposure have required more proof of injury than the 
mere fact of exposure and the minor discomfort that accompanies 
i t . In Burns v. Jaquavs Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 
1987) , 56 res idents of a t r a i l e r park located near an asbestos 
mine were exposed to airborne asbestos f i b e r s . Each person's 
cumulative exposure to asbestos p a r t i c l e $ was found to be greater 
than the average exposure of workers in the asbestos mines or in 
the m i l l i n g and manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s . All p l a i n t i f f s had 
asbes tos f ibers in the i r lungs. The court presumed that some of 
them would develop a s b e s t o s i s or a s b e s t o s - r e l a t e d d i s e a s e . Id. 
at 30. The t r i a l court , however, granted summary judgment d i s -
miss ing the p l a i n t i f f s ' claim for damages for personal injury. 
3
 The Utah Court of Appeals recently disciissed "increased risk" as i t 
applies to causation in medical malpractice cases. See George v. LPS Hospi-
ta l , 797 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah App. 1990) ( l i a b i l i t y may attach when the neg-
ligence of the defendant i s a substantial factor [rather than the sole factor] 
in bringing about injury). The court quoted Section 323(a) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965) for the proposition that one who undertakes to render 
services to another and does so negligently, i s subject to l i a b i l i t y for the 
resulting physical harm i f his negligence increased the risk of such harm. 
797 P.2d 1122 n.5 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 323(a)). The hold-
ing in George i s inapplicable in the present case because Mountain Fuel did 
not undertake to perform services for pla int i f fs and because no bodily injury 
has occurred in this case. In any event, George cannot be construed as creat-
ing a cause of action for increased risk of harm in the absence of actual 
bodily harm. 
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The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, 
stating: 
It is clear from the record that none of the 
plaintiffs has been diagnosed as having 
asbestosis. Some of the plaintiffs claim to 
be suffering from mental anguish as a result 
of the exposure to asbestos, but there is no 
competent evidence of any physical impairment 
or harm caused by this exposure. "The threat 
of future harm, not yet realized, is not 
enough." 
Id. (quoting Prosser & Keaton on The Law of Torts, S 30 at 165 
(5th ed. (1984)). 
In Burns, the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the 
rationale articulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when 
it adjudicated the same question in connection with a claim 
brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"). In 
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 
1985), a group of railroad workers sought to recover damages for 
asbestos-related injuries. The court held that, although the 
workers had been exposed to asbestos, the resultant "subclinical 
injury" was insufficient as a matter of law to create a cause of 
action. Id. at 942. The court noted that, in the context of 
asbestos-related torts, to recognize a cause of action for mere 
exposure to asbestos would allow "seemingly healthy railroad 
workers . . . who might never manifest injury" to being a federal 
claim for personal injury. Jtd. The court stated: 
It is obvious that proof of damages in such 
cases would be highly speculative, likely 
resulting in windfalls for those who would 
never take ill and insufficient compensation 
for those who do. Requiring manifest injury 
as a necessary element of an asbestos-related 
tort action avoids these problems and best 
serves the underlying purposes of tort law: 
-18-
the compensation of victims who have 
suffered. 
Id. (emphasis added) ( c i t a t i ons omitted.) 
Since the decision in Schweitzer, many courts have 
denied claims for asbestos exposure for the same reason. The 
fact tha t asbestos inhalat ion may cause injury is insuf f ic ien t 
proof of damage or loss to maintain a cause of act ion in the 
absence of some manifestation of present ly ex is t ing 
4 
a sbes tos - re l a t ed d i sease . 
In a recent decision from the United Sta tes D i s t r i c t 
Court for the D i s t r i c t of Hawaii, the cpurt recognized the need 
to e s t ab l i sh object ive c r i t e r i a for asbes tos - re la ted claims. In 
In Re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-67, 
(D. Hawaii 1990), the court noted that over 20 mil l ion Americans 
have had s ign i f i can t exposure to asbestos and tha t in many cases , 
such people suffer no functional impairment as a r e s u l t . 
Although the presence of asbestos f ibers in the lungs may cause 
s u b - c l i n i c a l changes in lung t i s s u e , the court was of the opinion 
tha t such ef fec ts of asbestos exposure did not cons t i t u t e a com-
pensable injury. I d . at 1567. The couift concluded tha t i t was 
4
 The following courts are among those that have held that damages for 
exposure to asbestos are inappropriate unless and until asbestos-related d i s -
ease i s manifest: In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Casesy 734 F. Supp, 1563 (D. 
Hawaii 1990); Burns v. Jaguays Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1987); 
DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App. 1987); Mauro v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1988), aff'd sub 
nom. Mauro v. Raymark Industries, et a l . f 561 A.id 527 (N.J. 1989); Devlin v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. 1985); Pollack v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.N.J. 1988); Lavelle v. Owens Corning 
Fiberglass Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1.987); Schweitzer v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
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"sheer speculation to measure the loss that plaintiff may have 
suffered for pleural plaques alone since sub-clinical conditions 
such as pleural plaques or pleural thickening are normally not 
associated with physical impairment." Id. The court held that 
neither special damages nor general damages were appropriate 
without a showing of chronic pain or impairment: 
Plaintiffs must show a compensable harm by 
adducing objective testimony of a functional 
impairment due to asbestos exposure. A 
claimant's subjective testimony as to short-
ness of breath and fatigue without more is 
not sufficient. In other words, the mere 
presence of asbestos fibers, plural thicken-
ing or plural plaques in the lung 
unaccompanied by objective verifiable func-
tional impairment is not enough. 
Id. at 1567 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted.) 
While the Hawaii District Court focused the inquiry on 
the degree of impairment instead of the fact of injury, under 
either approach, the result is the same. Sub-clinical injury 
without presently existing bodily harm does not amount to reason-
ably certain proof of damages due to asbestos exposure, and, 
under Utah law, such a claim must be dismissed. See Sawyers v. 
F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) ("fact of dam-
ages must be proven with reasonable certainty"). 
There is no genuine issue of fact in the instant case 
as to whether any of the plaintiffs have manifested any presently 
existing asbestos-related disease. There was no medical evidence 
before the District Court as to whether or to what extent plain-
tiffs in this case have suffered "sub-clinical" injury. Assum-
ing, arguendo, plaintiffs have asbestos fibers in their lungs, 
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still they may never develop any disease or suffer any disabil-
ity. Apart from sub-cellular impact, plaintiffs have not alleged 
that any of them suffered injury or impairment as a result of 
exposure to asbestos. No plaintiff was treated for symptoms of 
immediate exposure to asbestos. No plainjtiff alleged that he has 
any permanent injury as a result of exposure and there is no med-
ical opinion in the record to show that any plaintiff is likely 
to have permanent injury as a result of fexposure. The only phy-
sician to examine plaintiffs concluded that "none of these indi-
viduals presented . . • evidence of respiratory disorders which 
could be meaningfully related to [the Mountain Fuel] exposure." 
(R.373.) No plaintiff alleged that he incurred any medical 
expenses and no plaintiff claimed any loss of wages, earnings or 
income as a result of any incident alleged in this lawsuit. 
(R.255-58, 275-78, 292-95, 313-16, 332-3$.) Plaintiffs' initial 
symptoms of discomfort caused by inhaling dust are simply not 
compensable. It is respectfully submitted that the authorities 
discussed above have dismissed stronger Claims than those in the 
instant case. As a matter of law, plaintiffs simply have not 
proffered reasonably certain proof of daimages, and the District 
Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for damages for personal 
injury should be sustained. 
B. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled td damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Although the plaintiffs have 
claimed that they experienced insomnia ana general anxiety, none 
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of them have alleged that they suffer from "cancerphobia" or any 
other substantial psychological disturbance. In addition to the 
complete absence of any physical injury, none of them have 
alleged that they experienced any physical symptom resulting from 
emotional distress. Furthermore, no plaintiff has ever sought or 
received treatment for depression, anxiety, or any form of emo-
tional distress or any physical illness caused by emotional dis-
tress. Under Utah law, plaintiffs cannot recover damages for 
negligent infliction of such emotional distress because they have 
not demonstrated that they have suffered resulting illness or 
bodily harm. 
The Supreme Court of Utah recently recognized a cause 
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the Court sustained 
an award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress when a man and his 8-year-old son were struck by a truck. 
The father claimed damages for the emotional distress caused when 
he observed his son killed in the accident. .Id. at 778-84. 
While the Court did not consider the circumstances under which a 
direct victim may recover damages for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, it did provide some guidance. The majority 
of the Court adopted the analysis of Section 313 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Ld. at 785 (Zimmerman, J. concurring in 
part). Section 313 provides as follows: 
5
 Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion represented the views of the 
majority of the Court on the issues it addressed because three other justices 
concurred in his concurring opinion. Id. at 784 n.l. 
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(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emo-
tional distress to another, he is subject to 
liability to the other for resulting illness 
or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his 
conduct involved an unreasonable 
risk of causing the distress, oth-
erwise than by knowledge of the 
harm or peril of a third person, 
and 
(b) from facts known to him should 
have realized that the distress, if 
it were caused, might rtesult in 
illness or bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no 
application to illness or bodily harm of 
another which is caused by emotional distress 
arising solely from harm or periil to a third 
person, unless the negligence of the actor 
has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm to the other. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 313 (]J965) (emphasis added). 
Although the Court recognized the diflficulty of applying a 
"zone-of-danger" rule in the case of a bystander plaintiff, it 
also recognized that Section 313 provides an objective standard 
to identify those who are eligible to recover damages for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. Considering the alterna-
tives, the Court thought it best "to adopt as the test for deter-
mining liability for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress the standards set forth in Section 313 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965), as explained in the comments accompany-
ing that section." Id. at 785. 
The court in Johnson was primarily concerned with the 
application of the provision in subsectibn (2) of Section 313. 
In the present case, plaintiffs are nc^ t seeking damages for 
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emotional distress arising out of harm or peril to a third per-
son; they are seeking damages as direct victims. Thus, subsec-
tion (2) is inapplicable. Subsection (1) addresses the issue in 
the present case. It imposes liability only for "resulting ill-
ness or bodily harm." It does not create a cause of action for 
mere physiological disturbance. Comment "a" to subsection (1) 
provides: 
a. The rule stated in this Section does not 
give protection to mental and emotional tran-
quility in itself. In general, as stated in 
S 436A, there is no liability where the 
actor's negligent conduct inflicts only emo-
tional distress, without resulting bodily 
harm or any other invasion of the other's 
interests. Such emotional distress is impor-
tant only in so far as its existence involves 
a risk of bodily harm, and as affecting the 
damages recoverable if bodily harm is sus-
tained. See S 903. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 303 comment a (emphasis added). 
The comment refers to Section 436A which provides: 
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creat-
ing an unreasonable risk of causing either 
bodily harm or emotional disturbance to 
another, and it results in such emotional 
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or 
other compensable damage. the actor is not 
liable for such emotional disturbance. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 436A (1965) (emphasis added). 
Under the guidelines set out in the Restatement, there must be 
bodily harm or resulting illness in order to recover damages for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly adopted 
the provisions of Section 313 for determining when a direct vic-
tim may recover for negligent inflictions of emotional distress, 
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it has suggested an analogous ana even mpre direct approach. In 
the recent case of Dallev v. Utah Valley JReqional Medical Center, 
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), the Court held that a direct victim may 
recover for mental anguish only as an element of general damages. 
In Dallev, a hysterectomy patient received a burn on her leg dur-
ing surgery while she was under a general anesthetic. The Court, 
again referring to Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, noted that the plaintiff was the only person injured and 
that, because of her condition, she did not witness the injury. 
The Court stated: 
The possible mental and emotional damages 
suffered by plaintiff as a result of a per-
sonal physical injury are compensable through 
special damages and general damages for pain 
and suffering "covering not c^ nly the pain 
associated with the injury but also the men-
tal reaction to that pain and tb the possible 
consequences of the injury." 
Id. at 201 (citations omitted). The Court distinguished Johnson 
v. Rogers, in which the plaintiff was a bystander: 
The difference in the two theories is that 
awards for pain and suffering rbsult when the 
emotion trauma arises from the physical 
injury and awards for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress arise when physical or 
mental illness results from the emotional 
trauma itself. 
Id. Under the approach adopted in Dalley, a direct victim seek-
ing to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
must either demonstrate some physical injtiry that accompanies the 
initial event, or some later-manifested injury or illness caused 
by the emotional trauma of the event. In either case, there is 
no cause of action until the bodily h^rm or illness appears. 
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Once bodily harm or illness is manifest, the claimant may recover 
damages for mental anguish as part of general damages. Psycho-
logical harm or mental illness resulting from emotional trauma 
may satisfy the requirement of "bodily harm or illness," but the 
psychological harm must be sufficiently severe to amount to rea-
sonably certain proof of damages. See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts S 436A comment c (1965) (continued mental disturbance may 
amount to "substantial bodily harm"). 
Applying Section 313, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an emotional distress 
claim on facts very similar to those of the present case. In 
Burns v. Jaouavs Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1987), the 
claimants' expert opined that the claimants' emotional distress 
had caused them psychosomatic injuries consisting of "headaches, 
acid indigestion, weeping, muscle spasms, depression and insom-
nia." id. at 32. The court found that such symptoms were only 
"transitory physical phenomena" and "not the type of bodily harm 
which would sustain a cause of action for emotional distress." 
Id. The court relied on comment c to Section 436A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as follows: 
The rule [preventing recovery for emotional 
disturbance alone] applies to all forms of 
emotional disturbance, including temporary 
fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage, 
and humiliation. The fact that these are 
accompanied by transitory, non-recurring 
physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, 
such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like, 
does not make the actor liable where such 
phenomena are in themselves inconsequential 
and do not amount to any substantial bodily 
harm. On the other hand, long continued nau-
sea or headaches may amount to physical ill-
ness, which is bodily harm; and even long 
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cont inued mental d i s t u r b a n c e , as for example 
in the case of repea ted h y s t e r i c a l a t t a c k s , 
or mental a b e r r a t i o n , may be| c l a s s i f i e d by 
the c o u r t s as i l l n e s s , no twi ths tand ing t h e i r 
mental c h a r a c t e r . . . " 
Id , a t 32 (quot ing Restatement (Second) of Tor t s S 436A comment c 
( 1 9 6 5 ) ) . The cour t concluded t h a t f f [ t ] h e r e can be no c la im for 
damages for the fear of c o n t r a c t i n g a s b $ s t o s - r e l a t e d d i s e a s e s in 
t h e f u t u r e wi thout the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a bod i ly i n j u r y . " 758 
P.2d a t 32. The c l a i m a n t ' s headaches , ac id i n d i g e s t i o n , d e p r e s -
s i o n and insomnia d id not amount to bod i ly in ju ry w i th in the 
meaning of t he r u l e s e t out in the Res ta tement . Many c o u r t s con-
s i d e r i n g cases of exposure to a s b e s t o s have he ld t h a t mental 
anguish i s not a c t i o n a b l e "absent proof pf some p r e s e n t p h y s i c a l 
harm or med ica l ly i d e n t i f i a b l e e f f e c t . " E . g . , DeStor ies v . C i ty 
of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 710 (Ar iz . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . 6 
In the p r e s e n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ^ exper ienced only t r a n -
s i t o r y , n o n - r e c u r r i n g anx i e ty and s l e e p l e s s n e s s as a r e s u l t of 
t h e a l l e g e d exposure t o a s b e s t o s . (R.25X, 272, 289, 310, 328.) 
No p l a i n t i f f sought t r ea tment for pu re ly emotional d i s t r e s s . 
(R.253 , 264-65, 290-91 , 311, 330.) No p l a i n t i f f was ever t r e a t e d 
for any p h y s i c a l harm as a r e s u l t of asbejstos exposure or mental 
° The following courts are among those that h^ve held that there must be 
some physical harm in order to maintain a cause of action for negligent 
infl ict ion of emotional distress arising from exposure to asbestos: Herber v. 
Johns-Manville, 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3rd. Cir. 1986); Adams v. Johns-Manville, 783 
F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 
1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Installation, 324 
P.A. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493, 507-08 (Pa. Super. 1984); Mergenthaler v. 
Asbestos Corp. of America, 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. Sup. 1984); Nutt v. 
A.C.&S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 25-26 (Del. Sup. 1983), aff 'd, 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 
1984). 
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distress. (Id.) No plaintiff has been diagnosed as having 
"cancerphobia" or any other significant psychological or emo-
tional disturbance relating to exposure to asbestos. No plain-
tiff has even demonstrated sufficient concern about his present 
or future health to seek a medical examination. Indeed, Dr. 
Battigelli told all of the plaintiffs that their exposure to 
asbestos at Mountain Fuel's facility was "limited and perhaps 
inconsequential" (R.373.), and he told Silcox that he had nothing 
to worry about. (R.339.) Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence 
of severe emotional distress and no evidence of bodily harm or 
mental illness that might form the basis for a claim for emo-
tional distress. 
If this Court were to reverse the District Court's dis-
missal of plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress it would 
invite an unlimited number of claims for emotional distress, an 
injury that is easily feigned. The law must separate the genuine 
from the spurious claims for emotional injury, and the foregoing 
authorities draw that line squarely within the requirements of 
Utah law. The District Court correctly ruled that, on the undis-
puted evidence, plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress must be 
dismissed. 
C# Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For 
Medical Surveillance. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for medical sur-
veillance because they have proffered no evidence demonstrating 
that medical surveillance is reasonably necessary to detect and 
treat illness that may result from exposure to asbestos. 
-28-
In support of the ir claim for medical s u r v e i l l a n c e dam-
ages , p l a i n t i f f s c i t e several cases in which the claimants were 
7 
exposed to t o x i c chemicals . In the ir ana lys i s of the elements 
necessary to support a claim for medical s u r v e i l l a n c e damages, 
p l a i n t i f f s re ly on the c r i t e r i a s e t out in Merry v. Westinqhouse 
E lec . Corp., 684 F.Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988). In Merry, 
p l a i n t i f f s were exposed to tox ic chlorinated hydrocarbons that 
had been suspected of causing "numerous i l l n e s s e s , 
inc luding , . . . cancer, b irth d e f e c t s , damage to human c e l l s , 
kidney, l i v e r and brain damage, as wel l as damage to the human 
immune system," I d . at 848. There was expert medical opinion 
that i t would be " c l i n i c a l l y prudent and advisable to develop 
s p e c i a l l y t a i l o r e d medical surve i l l ance program for persons 
. . . [exposed] to a var i e ty of chlorinated hydrocarbons inc lud-
ing toluene and xylene , . . . [chemicals] known to be systemic 
poisons which can cause injury to mult iple organ systems." Id. 
at 851. There was a l so testimony that persons exposed to c h l o r i -
nated hydrocarbons were at a higher r isk of cancer than the gen-
era l population and should rece ive "more in tens ive medical moni-
tor ing than the general populat ion." IjJ. at 851-52 (quoting med-
i c a l t e s t imony) . The court considered three elements to be 
' Plaintiffs' primary cases involve exposure to toxic chemicals other than 
asbestos. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) 
(exposure to toxic chemicals leached from city landfill into claimant's water 
supply); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988) 
(claim by property owners whose wells had been contaminated by toxic sub-
stances); Villari v. Terminix International, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 
1987) (exposure to pesticide). Plaintiffs did not proffer medical opinion 
that special diagnostic treatment for asbestos-related disease is advisable. 
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necessary to recover damages for medical surveillance: "(1) 
exposure to hazardous substances; (2) the potential for injury; 
and (3) the need for early detection." id. at 850. While the 
court easily found the first two requirements had been satisfied, 
it noted that "[t]he second requirement presents a more difficult 
question." Ld. at 850. After a lengthy discussion of the prob-
lem of quantifying the risk of future disease, the court con-
cluded that claimants1 "enhanced risk of disease justifies peri-
odic medical examinations." id. at 852. 
The court in Merry unnecessarily introduced into its 
analysis an element of speculation, much like the speculation 
inherent in an analysis for an enhanced-risk claim. For a claim-
ant to prove "the potential for injury" he must speculate as to 
the medical probabilities that injury will occur. Under Utah 
law, a claim for medical expenses may not be based on the proba-
bility that a disease will develop in the future. Sawyers v. 
F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) (damages must 
be proven with reasonable certainty). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court used a more direct 
approach, and a fairer one, in determining the requirements for 
recovering medical surveillance damages. In Avers v* Jackson 
Township. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), the claimants 
had been exposed to toxic pollutants in their water system. A 
toxicologist testified that of 12 chemicals identified in the 
plaintiffs* well water, four were known carcinogens. Other chem-
icals found in the water supply were known to produce "liver and 
kidney damage, mutations and alterations in genetic material, 
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damage to blood and reproductive systems, neurological damage and 
skin irrigations." Ld. at 292. The trial court, in awarding 
damages for medical surveillance stated: "It is not the reason-
able probability of whether plaintiffs will suffer cancer in the 
future that should determine whether medical surveillance is nec-
essary. . . . Rather, it is whether it is necessary. . . . If 
plaintiffs are deprived . . . because they have no source of 
funds . . . consequences may result in serious if not fatal ill-
ness." Avers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73, 
461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983). 
The New Jersey Court of Appeals vacated the trial 
court's award of medical surveillance damages, holding that 
because the risk of injury was not reasonably probable. Ayers v. 
Jackson Township, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 
(1985). But the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals. It rejected an analysis that assumes that "the 
reasonableness of medical intervention, and, therefore, its 
compensability, depends solely on the sufficiency of proof that 
the occurrence of disease is probable." 525 A.2d at 309. 
Instead, the court focused on whether medical surveillance would 
be reasonable and necessary. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
stated: 
[W]e hold that the cost of medical surveil-
lance is a compensable item of damages where 
the proofs demonstrate, through reliable 
expert testimony predicated upon the signifi-
cance and extent of exposures to chemicals, 
the toxicity of the chemicals, the serious-
ness of the diseases for which individuals 
are at risk, the relative increase in the 
chance of onset of disease in those exposed, 
and the value of early diagnosis, that such 
surveillance to monitor the effect or 
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exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and 
necessary. 
525 A,2d at 312 (emphasis added). In addition to evidence of 
prolonged exposure to a variety of toxic substances, the claim-
ants in Avers proffered testimony that medical surveillance would 
improve the claimants' chances for detection and treatment of 
chemically induced illnesses. Id. Although the court denied 
compensation for future disease, it held that medical surveil-
lance damages may be awarded when surveillance would be reason-
able and necessary. 
In a case involving asbestos exposure, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals held that, under facts similar to those in the 
present case, medical surveillance damages were not reasonable 
and necessary. In DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 
(Ariz. App. 1987), employees of a subcontractor hired to renovate 
the lobby at the Phoenix airport were exposed to airborne asbes-
tos during the demolition phase of the work. The workers pre-
sented medical testimony that their exposure to asbestos had 
resulted in a significantly increased probability that they would 
contract mesothelioma. As in this case, however, there was no 
testimony that any worker required "any particular increase in 
the frequency, cost or intensity of . . . periodic medical exami-
nations over what would normally have been prudent for them based 
on their individual circumstances." id. at 711, The court 
affirmed the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for 
defendants concluding that "plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence 
that such expenses would be reasonably necessary." Id. 
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In the present case, plaintiffs presented no evidence 
in the District Court to show that medical surveillance would be 
reasonable and necessary. The only physician to examine plain-
tiffs was Dr. Battigelli and he did not suggest that plaintiffs 
would require any extraordinary medical surveillance. id. In 
their brief on appeal, plaintiffs refer to various medical and 
legal publications in support of their argument that medical sur-
veillance damages are proper. But the literature was not in evi-
dence in the District Court and there was no expert testimony 
commenting on the literature. The only medical expert involved 
in this case concluded that plaintiff's exposure was limited and 
probably inconsequential. (R.373.) He told them not to worry 
about it. (R.248.) 
Plaintiffs proffered no other expert testimony regard-
ing the extent or significance of their exposure. They presented 
no evidence regarding the toxicity of the particular type of 
asbestos involved. They presented no expert testimony regarding 
the value of early diagnosis or the necessity of specific diag-
nostic techniques to detect asbestos-related disease at an early 
stage. Finally, while it may be true that asbestos-related dis-
ease is best treated when detected early, there was no evidence 
before the District Court to suggest that early detection 
requires anything more than routine health maintenance. The Dis-
trict Court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claims for medical 
surveillance damages should be upheld because there is no indica-
tion that medical surveillance is reasonable or necessary or 
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would result in detection of lung disease any earlier than would 
regular, routine health examinations. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated no presently 
existing bodily injury. Accordingly, the district court properly 
dismissed their claims for personal injury and for emotional 
distress. Plaintiffs' claims for medical surveillance damages 
were also properly dismissed because there was no evidence to 
suggest that medical surveillance is reasonable and necessary 
under these circumstances. 
This case presents an important policy issue. It is 
common knowledge that literally millions of people have been 
exposed to asbestos, PCB's, dioxin: toxic chemicals, and 
polluted air or water. Our society and our legal system must 
develop meaningful guidelines to determine who among those mil-
lions have actionable claims. The logical solution, recognized 
in the Restatement and the cases cited above, is to require a 
demonstrable bodily injury. Plaintiffs presented no proof of 
such an injury and the judgment below, therefore, should be 
sustained. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully 
request that the Utah Supreme Court sustain the Third District 
Court's judgment dismissing with prejudice all of plaintiffs' 
claims for damages, including all claims for personal injury, for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for medical 
surveillance. 
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GORDON L. ROBERTS (2770) 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
RAY G. GROUSSMAN (1263) 
CHARLES E. GREENHAWT (4712) 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
TOM HANSEN, an individual; 
DOUGLAS A. HILTON, an 
individual; MIKE MACKINTOSH, 
an individual; BRUCE SILCOX, 
an individual; and RUSSELL 
VICKERS, an individual, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, ) 
a Utah corporation; ) 
ROGER BARRUS, an individual; ) 
ROGER MORSE, an individual; ) 
and JOHN DOES 1-25, ) Civil No. 890900920 PI 
Defendants. ) 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; ) Judge James S. Sawaya 
ROGER BARRUS, an individual; ) 
ROGER MORSE, an individual, ) 
c^^-^4--W-*/ 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. } 
CCI MECHANICAL, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation (formerly ) 
known as Climate Control, Inc., ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
The motion for summary judgment of defendants, Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, Roger Barrus and Roger Morse came on for a 
hearing before the above-entitled court on May 21, 1990, at the 
hour of two o'clock p.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
attorney, Paul D. Hatch, and defendants were represented by their 
attorney, Gordon L. Roberts. The Court, having considered the 
memoranda filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to 
such motion and having heard the arguments and statements of 
counsel, the Court being of the view that the Statute of Limita-
tions is not presently running against any of the plaintiffs 
because of the absence, at present, of any bodily injury, and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendants' 
motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiffs' Complaint 
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is dismissed with prejudice on the ground that no bodily injury 
has been manifested in any plaintiff. 
ENTERED this ^ ^ day of C^t^^n^ , 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
JAMES S. SAW. 
T COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on this 
day of rW*&*- * 1990. J*-
Paul D. Hatch 
James E. Morton 
Ronald C. Wolthuis 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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